Javakheti One Year after the August War by Abashidze, Archil
Policy Review
October 2009
The paper is published with the financial support of the Think Tank Fund of the Open Society Institue-Budapest. The opinions
it contains are solely those of the author and do not reflect the position of the OSI TTF.
1
 By Javakheti we mean the part of Samtskhe-Javakheti region which includes the municipalities of Aspindza, Akhalkalaki and
Ninotsminda. In the latter two, citizens of Armenian ethnicity make up over 95% of the local population. A total of 210,000
people live in Samtskhe-Javakheti, out of which 54.5% are Armenians, 43% – Georgians. The region is also home to small
communities of Russians, Ossetians, Greek and Ukrainians: http://www.regions.ge/Samtskhe-Javakheti (28.02.2009)
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Executive Summary
Because of its ethnic composition, Javakheti1  is often considered a politi-
cally problematic region for Georgia. This situation is aggravated by se-
vere social and economical conditions arising from the relatively harsh cli-
mate (cold winters) and economic underdevelopment which dates back to
the Soviet period.
After the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, the region once again be-
came the focus of political speculation. It was openly said in newspapers and
public speeches of some politicians that there are anti-Georgian forces in the
region seeking exploit existing problems in order to harm Georgian interests.
The present political analysis focuses on problem areas which were present
in the region long before the 2008 war, including issues relating to the law-
enforcement and judiciary systems; employment and migration; disputed
churches and the repatriation of Muslim Meskhetians.
The analysis reveals that despite achievements in some areas, the majority
of problems persist. The paper concludes with recommendations for the
central and local authorities, and NGOs and international agencies work-
ing in the region.
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Problem description and pertinence
Since the August war, the issue of Javakheti
has been regularly covered in the Georgian
press. For instance, in January 2009 the Versia
newspaper reported that Russia was encour-
aging the Armenian government to become
more active in Javakheti. According to Versia,
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin dis-
cussed a potential Georgian-Armenian armed
conflict with the presidents of Armenia and
Azerbaijan while hosting them in Kremlin.
The newspaper said that Yerevan refused,
though it questioned how long Armenia would
be able to resist the pressure from Moscow.2
Versia also cited Russian and Azerbaijani outlets
as saying that Russia supplied Armenia with arms
in December 2008. In newspaper interviews,
Georgian military experts presumed that these
arms may be intended for another anticipated
conflict. According to them, there is information
that the Russian defence minister assured his
Azerbaijani colleague that weapons will not be
used against Azerbaijan and that they were given
to Armenia for a different purpose.3
In January 2008, the 24 Saati newspaper
published an article by local analyst Andro
Barnov based on a study4  conducted by the
Center for Strategy and Development. Ac-
cording to the article, Russia tries to thwart
NATO’s efforts to gain a foothold in the
Caucasus and to this end will try to fully
control Georgia and Armenia by any means
and isolate Azerbaijan from Turkey. Russia
will try to settle the Karabakh conflict and
instead stoke conflict in Javakheti. This will
seriously endanger the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline
and other regional projects.5
Javakheti is considered by many to be a
weak point of the Georgian state, where the
chances of another Russian strike are high.
The question is: will this region, with its
severe political, economic and social prob-
lems, become an Achilles’ heel of the Geor-
gian state in the wake of the 2008 war? But
the present analysis doesn’t aim at assessing
outside threats. The objective is to evaluate
the status of traditional problems in the re-
gion based on the trends that have taken
shape after the 2008 war.
One of the indirect consequences of the 2008
war was the warming of Turkish-Armenian
relations. Although what will result from this
process is still unclear, it may have conse-
quences for the Javakheti region. If the
Turkish-Armenian border is opened, negative
effects may include the weakening of
Georgia’s transit function, directly influenc-
ing the Javakheti region, e.g. the Kars-
Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway project. In
addition, the government of Armenia may
become more active in discussing the prob-
lems of the people of Javakheti; for instance,
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan made a
statement that he would support granting
Armenian the status of official regional lan-
guage in Javakheti.6  On the other hand, the
2
 „Putin offers Armenia to start war against Georgia“, Versia, January 28-29, 2009, Agency Medianews. Newspaper Kviris
Palitra published a comprehensive article on the same topic on November 9, 2009. Also, see Caucasian Integration, Liberal
September 9, 2009.
3
 „Putin offers Armenia to start war against Georgia“, Versia, January 28-29, 2009, Agency Medianews.
4
 Full text of the study: http://stand.ge/?page=11&lang=geo&content=148
5
 Andro Barnov, “Caucasian Geo-politics and Geo-strategy”, 24 Saati, January 17, 2009.
6
 Sargsyan made this statement during a meeting with Armenian diplomats on September 1, 2009 – see Armenian president
speaks about the need of Armenian as regional language, http://www.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=21721&search=javakheti.
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fears Javakhetians have long had about Tur-
key will probably decrease.
Methodology
The present study used materials about the
Javakheti region published in print and elec-
tronic media and the materials provided by
the regional partners of the Caucasus Insti-
tute for Peace, Democracy and Development.
On June 15, 2009, CIPDD hosted a round
table where invited experts and civil society
representatives shared their views regarding
the issues discussed in the present analysis.
The present study includes views expressed
during the round table event.
Javakheti during the August war
The August war horrified Javakheti society
as much as that of all other Georgian re-
gions: everybody’s concern was “Russian
aggression”. Despite the fact that the ma-
jority of the population condemned Russia’s
invasion, there was disagreement over the
causes of the war. It must be noted that
this disagreement led to tension between
citizens of Armenian and Georgian origin.
Presumably the reason for this was that the
main sources of information for the non-
Georgian population were Russian televi-
sion channels and internet sites. Consider-
ing that before and during the August war
these media channels maintained aggressive
and targeted anti-Georgian propaganda, it
is clear how the opinion of the local popu-
lation was formed regarding the ongoing
situation. In addition, Georgian TV news
were broadcast on local channels only dur-
ing evenings (after the war one of the TV
channels resumed broadcasting only on Au-
gust 12), and telephone communication was
limited due to overload.
It should be pointed out that the Russian
propaganda was partly effective: the Rus-
sian view of the conflict instilled the fear
among the Armenian population that next
target of the Georgian administration would
be their region. However, there was another
opinion, according to which Russia was
named as reason of war, and the Georgian
government was only responding to provo-
cation. Many saw the war as an expression
of the global antagonism between Washing-
ton and Moscow.
When Russian air forces started attacking
and bombing residential buildings, the fear
emerged among the Javakheti population that
Russians would launch airstrikes on the
closed Russian military base in Akhalkalaki.
Many fled to villages, some left for Arme-
nia. The panic was aggravated by misinfor-
mation spread by electronic media that Ar-
menian youth were forcibly and hastily (at
night) conscripted into the Georgian armed
forces and that Georgian-Armenian border
was closed to young men. Rumors spread
that Russia was going to deploy its forces
from its base in Gyumri, Armenia and open
a third front. In fact, Russian helicopters
which entered from Armenia did fly over
the region several times. Another rumor was
spread that Russian politicians had said on
TV that Russian military forces would do no
harm to Javakheti population. This created
some tension between the local Armenian- and
Georgian-speaking populations. Later, local
authorities and state agencies assured the
population that the spread of Russian aggres-
sion to the region was unlikely.
War-induced emotions declined after French
President Nicolas Sarkozy and his Russian
counterpart Dmitriy Medvedev concluded a
cease-fire agreement on August 12, yet dis-
cussion resumed, albeit quietly, after Russia
recognized the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia on August 26. Russia’s disre-
gard for the international community and
recognized norms was viewed in the
Caucasus as a show of force and a “lesson
given” to the West.
One of the indirect consequences of the 2008
war was the warming of Turkish-Armenian
relations. Although what will result from this
process is still unclear, it may have consequences
for the Javakheti region.
Population of Samtskhe-Javakheti is 210, 000, of which 54.5 % are ethnic Armenians, 43 % –
Georgians. In the region there are also living small communities of Russians, Ossetians, Greeks and
Ukrainians.
Source: http://www.regions.ge/Samtskhe-Javakheti
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Problems of the region
Since 2004 there have been many improve-
ments in the Javakheti region: roads are
being renovated, natural gas distribution
networks are being built for the first time,
and an important rail link is under construc-
tion. However, there are many different and
long-established problems. The problem ar-
eas that bother local communities the most
are grouped and reviewed below. It should
be mentioned that majority of these prob-
lems are not linked to the August 2008 war.
a) Work of law-enforcement and judicial
systems
Certain distrust towards the law-enforcement
and judicial systems arose among the
region’s ethnic Armenian population after
several civil activists were detained. In Janu-
ary 2009 Gregory Minasyan, director of an
Akhaltsikhe youth center and Sargis
Hakobjanyan, chairman of the Charles
Aznavour Society, were detained. Both were
accused of spying and forming illegal armed
groups7 . The arrests sparked protests not only
among the local Armenian community, but
also among the Armenian Diaspora of vari-
ous countries. The form of arrests caused
the most public outrage: law-enforcement
executives arrested Minasyan at the youth
center, during a class, and Hakobjanyan was
arrested at a local cemetery, during a fu-
neral. The next day, locals, mainly young
people, held a small protest rally, though
most Javakhetians chose to wait for the trial.
The local community reviewed different
versions regarding the reasons for the ar-
rest of Minasyan and Hakobjanyan. Some
linked it to their active involvement in the
campaign surrounding disputed churches.
Others expressed the opinion that the ar-
rests were used by the central Georgian
government to divert attention from the
severe economic and social problems to the
“traditional problem” of Javakheti– the
demand for autonomy.
Public opinion linked the arrests of Minasyan
and Hakobjanyan with the resonant arrests
of Gurgen Shirinyan (member of the Javakhk
organization) and Vaagn Chakhalyan (of the
Akhalkalaki Youth Organization) in July
2008. These persons have been accused of
organizing an explosion near the house of
the chief of Akhalkalaki police and later
arrested on charges of illegal acquisition and
possession of weapons. Chakhalyan’s trial
was accompanied by an active information
campaign, with the participation of nation-
alist organizations from Armenia and the
Diaspora.
The local community attributed the arrests
of Shirinyan and Chakhalyan to an alleged
conflict between the local chief of police,
Samvel Petrosyan, and the detainees, and
was largely distrustful towards the role of
law-enforcement and the judicial system
with regard to the matter. In January 2009
Chakhalyan made an official statement in
which he spoke about the violation of his
rights by the court and political persecu-
tion. In particular, he said the Ministry of
Justice refused to register his French law-
yer and that inadequate translation was
provided by the court. The human rights
ombudsman reacted to the matter and in
his statement drew attention to the prob-
lems posed to the French attorney.8  In April
2009 Chakhalyan was sentenced to 10 years
in prison.
It should be pointed out that the Russian
propaganda was partly effective: the Russian
view of the conflict instilled the fear among the
Armenian population that next target of the
Georgian administration would be their region.
However, there was another opinion, according
to which Russia was deemd responsible for the
war, and the Georgian government was only
responding to provocation. Many saw the war as
an expression of the global antagonism between
Washington and Moscow.
The problem areas that bother local
communities the most are not linked to the
August 2008 war.
7
 In March 2009 the detainees were released from custody with one year conditional sentence and on the security of GEL
2,000. Georgian Pirveli information agency http://pirweli.com.ge/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=20670&Itemid=52
8
 For details, see statement of the human rights ombdusman of Georgia: http://www.ombudsman.ge/index.php?m=8&newsid=979
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b) Disputed churches
The issue of disputed churches in Georgian
territory is an especially sensitive one in
relations between the Georgian Orthodox
Patriarchate and the Armenian Apostolic
Church and has an added political dimen-
sion.9  Armenian print media frequently cover
the issue by highlighting what they call the
misappropriation of Armenian churches by
Georgia as an illustrative example of op-
pression of Armenian community and cul-
ture in Georgia. Armenia openly demands
that the Norashen church in Tbilisi and the
Surbnishan church in Akhaltsikhe be handed
over to the Armenian Chuch. Disputed
churches are property of the Georgian state.
However, because of the particular sensitiv-
ity of the issue, the government of Georgia
avoids solving the problem without the con-
sent of the the Georgian Orthodox Church.
The disputed churches, as a result of certain
incidents, periodically come to the public’s
attention. One significant occurence took place
in December 2008 during the visit of Arme-
nian Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan to Geor-
gia. Together with several Georgian officials,
Sargsyan and the Armenian delegation entered
Norashen, which is non-operational and locked
shut. This incident provoked outrage in na-
tionalist media outlets in both Georgia and
Armenia. Some stated that Georgian and Ar-
menian officials “broke into” the church and
“broke open its doors”. One Georgian news-
paper published an article according to which
after the August war Armenia has become
especially active and is seeking to exploit
Georgia’s difficulties in order to settle church
disputes in its favor10 . Georgian opposition MP
Jondi Bagaturia demanded the resignation and
trial of Environment Minister Goga Khachidze
and Minister of State for Diaspora Issues Iulon
Gagoshidze over the “break-in” at the church.11
The head of the Georgian Church, Patriarch
Ilia II, proposed an initiative to create an
Armenian-Georgian committee on disputed
churches. The prime ministers of both coun-
tries approved the initiative, though some
groups in Javakheti said this was an effort
to stall a resolution.
Source: Samtskhe-Javakheti Regional Development Agency, http://sjrda.org/eng/
The issue of disputed churches in Georgian
territory is an especially sensitive one in
relations between the Georgian Orthodox
Patriarchate and the Armenian Apostolic Church
and has an added political dimension
9
 “The issue of so-called disputed religious buildings is a significant one, and concerns the return of not only Armenian, but
also Catholic, Muslim and Jewish properties” – Report of the Georgian Human Rights Ombudsman on state of human rights
in Georgia, 2008, II half, http://www.ombudsman.ge/uploads/reports/saxalxo_damcvelis_angarishi__2008_ii__naxevari.pdf
10
 Sakartvelos Respublika newspaper December 17, 2008 http://www.opentext.org.ge/08/sakartvelos-respublika/235/235-18.htm
11
 Akhali Taoba newspaper January 13, 2009.
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c) Employment and Migration
Unemployment is a severe problem in the
region. Since the Soviet period, much of
the population has been engaged in sea-
sonal migration, seeking work mainly in
Russia. According to a local newspaper,
every year approximately 20,000 residents
seek seasonal jobs in Russia and Arme-
nia, and during 1990-2008 a sum total of
up to 100,000 people migrated to other
regions of Georgia and foreign coun-
tries.12  The region is not threatened with
depopulation, however, as birth rates are
high locally.
The recent extreme deterioration of Geor-
gian-Russian relations has made it difficult
for Georgian citizens to move to Russia. As
a result, many Javakhetians decided to ob-
tain Armenian citizenship and seek Russian
visas with their Armenian passports (though
quantitative data on this matter are contra-
dictory and inaccurate). Armenia accepts dual
citizenship, though many Javakhetians are
unaware that after acquiring Armenian citi-
zenship they lose Georgian citizenship and
maintain only the right to live in Georgia. It
is expected that this may cause severe ten-
sions in future.
After the withdrawal of the Russian military
base in Akhalkalaki in 2007, the main con-
sumer of local products, potatoes, was gone
(the base consumed ca. 500 tons per year).13
There are no prospects for this demand to
be replaced. Ongoing large-scale projects in
the region partly help in solving the prob-
lem of employment, though they are also a
source of disappointment and new protests,
as project implementors often prefer to bring
their own workers instead of employing lo-
cals. Despite the ongoing gasification and
road rehabilitation programs, which are very
popular, the population is still disappointed,
because they are not involved in those
projects.
The issue of employment is directly con-
nected to the qualification of the local
workforce, which is less competitive in a
labor market created by international projects.
This situation has served to highlight the
lack of professional education in the region.
The economic development of the region
and solving of the problem of unemploy-
ment is closely connected to the region’s
involvement in important transit projects.
Particularly important is the Kars-
Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway project,
Source: Samtskhe-Javakheti Regional Development Agency, http://sjrda.org/eng/regional-plan/
12
 Akunk newspaper, January 2009.
13
 In connection to the issue, see the article “Harvest is in storage, the population – in debt” in the local Samkhretis Karibche
newspaper, http://www.regions.ge/Samtskhe-Javakheti
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which was inaugurated on July 23, 2008 in
Kars. According to the plan, the project will
be finished in 2009 and trains will start
running from 2010. Construction was tem-
porarily halted during the August war.14
This project will create new economic op-
portunities for the local community, though
local attitudes towards this project are di-
vided. New prospects of economic devel-
opment create positive views among people,
but some think that the railway is purely a
military and political project that seeks to
isolate Armenia. Some fear that there is a
possibility of introducing additional Geor-
gian military forces under the pretence of
protecting the new railway; others fear that
Turkish and Azerbaijani employers will ig-
nore the local Armenian workforce and
bring in “their own people”.
Additional questions have arisen with regard
to the project since prospects of a warming
of Turkish-Armenian relations emerged. How-
ever, experts say that since the matter is
extremely delicate and will likely take a long
time to resolve, it is doubtful that it can
pose any serious threat to the railway
project.15  On the contrary, this development
has diminished the “anti-Armenian” image
of the project.
d) Education
Most problems in the field of education are
related to the lack of knowledge of the state
language among locals. This is one of the
biggest barriers to civil integration. The non-
Georgian population is cut-off from country’s
public life. The majority of Armenian youth
cite their lack of knowledge of Georgian
when they refuse to join the military.16
Even though the state and international or-
ganizations focused attention on this prob-
lem long ago, progress towards its resolu-
tion has been very slow. Despite some ac-
tions by the Ministry of Education and Sci-
ence (e.g. development of new methodology
and handbooks for teaching Georgian lan-
guage designed especially for minorities),
secondary/high schools cannot provide in-
struction of the Georgian language at the
necessary level. Consequently, graduates from
Armenian- and Russian-language schools do
not possess the minimum required level of
Georgian language knowledge. Periodically
Georgian and international organizations or-
ganize Georgian language learning courses
for adults, though these programs are not
regularly provided and cannot ensure a break-
through. The Ministry of Education and
Science is trying to reach better results
through introducing bilingual methodology,
though due to the lack of resources this only
takes place in several schools of the region.
Another significant problem is the weak
motivation for learning Georgian among the
local population. Akhalkalaki and
Ninotsminda Districts form what is essen-
tially an Armenian-speaking language envi-
ronment where local Georgians are also flu-
ent in Armenian. On the other hand, be-
cause the Russian military base was the
centerpiece of the local economy for years
and the majority of population is engaged
in seasonal migration to Russia, the Russian
language is also traditionally strong. The
majority of local population do not see a
real need to study Georgian, and the strength-
ening of state efforts in this direction are
perceived as a step towards assimilation.
However, in recent years, as the strengthen-
ing of Georgian state becomes apparent, there
have been signs that more people recognize
that knowledge of Georgian language im-
proves chances for success in social and
economic life, and thus there is an increased
interest in studying Georgian.
Many Javakhetians are unaware that after
acquiring Armenian citizenship they lose
Georgian citizenship and maintain only the right
to live in Georgia. It is expected that this will
cause severe tensions in future.
The issue of employment is directly connected to
the qualification of the local workforce, which is
less competitive in a labor market created by
international projects.
14
 Versia newspaper, August 20-21, 2008.
15
 Akhali Taoba newspaper, September 8, 2008.
16
 For details see the article “Conscription under way” in Samkhretis Karibche newspaper, http://www.regions.ge/Samtskhe-
Javakheti
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Language is also a problem in terms of
obtaining a higher education. Lack of
knowledge of Georgian leaves practically
no chances for the youth of the region to
enroll in Georgian universities. In 2008
heated debates took place (including in par-
liament) about whether or not to make
entrance examination in Georgian language
less difficult for non-Georgian applicants.
The dominant opinion was that this kind
of leniency would further weaken motiva-
tion for learning the Georgian language
among the youth.17  Meanwhile, the state
ensures certain measures which make
easier for minorities to enroll in Georgian
universities: they are can take the exami-
nation in their mother tongue in skills and
certain subjects.
The majority of ethnic Armenian youth nev-
ertheless prefer to receive higher education
in Armenia. There is a 70 person quota for
students from Javakheti at Armenian univer-
sities. According to existing data, 186 and
314 students from Georgia enrolled in
Yerevan universities in the years 2004 and
2008, respectively. After graduation many
chose to stay and work in Armenia. Some
Javakhetian Armenians view this as part of
an effort to “banish” Armenians from the
region.18
Two Georgian higher education institutions
function in Akhalkalaki: Akhalkalaki Col-
lege and the Tsodna Institute, which accom-
modates ethnic Armenian students as well.
Joint study brings Georgian and Armenian
youth closer. Some in the Armenian com-
munity are demanding the establishment of
a joint Georgian-Armenian university in
Akhalkalaki.
e) Issue of Repatriation of Muslim Meskhetians
The issue of repatriation of Muslim
Meskhetians19 , exiled by Stalin to Central
Asia in 1944, is one of most acute prob-
lems facing the region. However, it should
be mentioned that this problem doesn’t con-
cern Javakheti that much, as Muslims were
exiled mainly from nearby Akhaltsikhe and
Adigeni Districts (Meskheti) and they seek
settlement exactly in these areas.
In 2008 the Georgian parliament extended the
deadline for submission of requests for repa-
triation for Meskhetians until July 1, 2009. Since
the law “on repatriation of persons forcedly
banished in 1940-1950 from Georgian SSR by
Most problems in the field of education are
related to the lack of knowledge of the state
language among locals. Even though the state
and international organizations focused attention
on this problem long ago, progress towards its
resolution has been very slow.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kars_Baku_Tbilisi_railway_line
17
 “Akhali Taoba”, June 25, 2008.
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19
 The name of this ethno-confessional group is itself a sensitive issue and subject of political controversy. The 1944 banishment
was marked with religious discrimination: among those deported were Muslims of different nationalities. Presently, the majority
of this group identify themselves as Turkish. In research and international materials they are referred as “Meskhetian Turks”,
however, there are also some who identify themselves as Georgians.
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the former USSR” went into effect, 2,00020
requests have been submitted to the repatriation
agency, while the number of requests submitted
to Consulates in Azerbaijan has reached
15,00021 . These are mainly Muslim Meskhetians
living in Russia and Azerbaijan. According to
most experts, the total number of the members
of this dispersed ethno-confessional group in
former Soviet states, Turkey and other coun-
tries reaches 300,000. The chairman of the Vatan
organization (the strongest organization, which
defends rights of Muslim Meskhetians),
Suleiman Barbakadze, attributes the lack of
requests to the lack of information among the
group. According to him, approximately 90,000
Meskhetians in different countries seek repa-
triation to Georgia.
Meanwhile, the aforementioned law on repa-
triation only enables repatriation without any
material assistance or restitution of property
for repatriates. Thus, the prospect for their
return is closely linked to their capability to
obtain needed property for living in Georgia.
This in turn decreases the number of those
with a realistic outlook on repatriation.
Residents of the region are negative towards
the repatriation process, but recently the level
of concern has decreased. After the law came
into effect, only a small number of Muslim
Meskhetians managed to buy houses and
settle in Georgian villages. This has not
caused an overall increase of tensions in the
region, but there have been conflicts between
local and newly settled young people. Com-
munities of certain Georgian and practically
all Armenian villages are against the repa-
triation of Muslim Meskhetians. In these
villages Meskhetians are denied the right to
buy property and settle.
Repatriates face serious problems in terms
of legal status, economic capacity and so-
cial and cultural adaptation. For example,
Meskhetians who have returned from Rus-
sia are in a very difficult situation: they
still have Russian passports and their vi-
sas for legal stay in Georgia have ex-
pired. Thus, they are subject to deporta-
tion. Many seek seasonal jobs in Turkey
and have to buy visas or pay bribes when
crossing the Georgian border. The major-
ity of those deported cannot speak Geor-
gian, which seriously hinders their inte-
gration into Georgian society. However,
their children often study in Georgian
schools, which does create better pros-
pects for their integration.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The present study does not aim at assessing
and predicting external threats. Whether or
not external forces will try to destabilize the
region depends on the position and actions
of the international community. Therefore, it
is more reasonable to address the issue of
traditional problems of the region and di-
recting resources and efforts towards their
resolution.
It should be pointed out that recently the
state has intensified its efforts to support the
development of the region.22  Several infra-
structure projects are being implemented (e.g.
gasification of villages). According to David
Tkeshelashvili, minister of state for regional
development and infrastructure, plans for
2009 include the improvement of the water
supply of Samtskhe-Javakheti, gasification,
and improvement of school and kindergarten
infrastructure.23  Also, the region’s local bud-
get will be significantly increased.
The issue of repatriation of Muslim Meskhetians
doesn’t concern Javakheti that much, as
Muslims were exiled mainly from nearby
Akhaltsikhe and Adigeni Districts (Meskheti) and
they seek settlement exactly in these areas.
20
 „New deadlines are set for submitting applications for Muslim Meskhs”, Civil.ge, 17 July 2009 http://www.civil.ge/geo/
article.php?id=21531&search=
21
 http://www.regions.ge/Samtskhe-Javakheti&newsid=60&year=2009&position=news_category
22
 It should be pointed out that the National Concept on Tolerance and Civil Integration adopted in May 2009 addresses and
includes many of the problem issues discussed above. The action plan defines the particular actions which should be imple-
mented by 2014 in the following fields: education and state language, media and access to information, political integration and
civil participation, social and regional integration, culture and preserving ethnic identity.
23
 The process of gasification has started in Akhaltsikhe. The city will get gas within a month and a half and villages will be
gradually connected to the system. 32-kilometer pipeline is being built by the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation and “New
Energy”. Source: http://www.1tv.ge/ReadMore.aspx?LanguageID=1&Location=3929 Source: http://www.1tv.ge/
ReadMore.aspx?LanguageID=1&Location=1989 (28.02.2009)
CIPDD Policy Review, October 2009
10
However, many of actions are spontaneous
and uncoordinated. In fact, there is no strat-
egy based on complex research and there is
a lack of reliable data concerning the re-
gion. There are talks about the success of
projects implemented, but detailed informa-
tion regarding these projects is often not
accessible to the public.
Human rights and the transparency of the
government remain problematic issues. Ac-
cording to existing data, there are more fre-
quent cases of short-term detentions under
dubious motives of local journalists and
members of NGOs by the police. Journalists
and NGOs complain about difficulties in
obtaining public information.
The lack of sources of information accessible
to minorities is connected with the lack of
knowledge of the Georgian language, as well
as with the deficiency of central and local
information channels.24  Some important mea-
sures have been taken in recent years to
address the problem,25  though the existence
of free media which would serve as a forum
for discussing local problems is of vital im-
portance. Also, it is important improve the
qualifications of local journalists.
We base following recommendation on prob-
lems and trends discussed above:
Human rights and good governance:
• Adequate attention should be paid to the
reported facts of human rights violations;
ensure fair and equal realization of basic
rights (to central and local governments,
NGOs).
• Support integration of the Muslim
Meskhetians through information cam-
paigns and improvement of conditions
locally (to local government, international
organizations and NGOs).
Realization of economic rights:
• Support employment of the local
workforce; commence retraining programs
(to central and local governments, inter-
national organizations).
• Better inform the population regarding
ongoing rehabilitation projects and em-
ployment options (to local government).
Education, media and cultural rights:
• Increase the focus and effectiveness of
Georgian language courses for citizens
and for those employed in public service
(to central and local governments, inter-
national organizations).
• Take measures to raise the qualifications
and motivation of Georgian language
teachers (to central and local govern-
ments).
• Increase the volume and diversity of the
information accessible to the region’s
population. Namely, central and local TV
channels should increase geographical
coverage; free media should be developed
in the region (to central and local gov-
ernments, international organizations and
NGOs).
• Provide the public with comprehensive
and unbiased information regarding the
problems of churches and other objects
of cultural heritage trough public discus-
sions and information campaigns (to
NGOs and media)
24
 The present study does not cover the media landscape of the region. Regarding this issue see CIPDD, Georgia’s regional
media-map, Tbilisi and newspapers outside the capital, 2007.
25
 Regions.ge is the first internet resource in Georgia which provides information on events in the various regions of the
country. Fourteen regions have their own sites which link to the website, including Samtskhe-Javakheti’s Samkhretis Karibche
are already available on the website. Source: http://rustavi2.com/news/news_textg.php?id_news=30446&pg=1&im=main&ct=0&wth=
Please visit CIPDD’s blog at www.cipdd.org to comment on the paper.
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